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The Uniform Commercial Code-
A Third Look?
Robert Braucher
The Uniform Commercial Code now has been enacted in eighteen
states,' and its sponsors are looking forward to further enactments during
1963 legislative sessions. Originally proposed in 1940, the Code was
approved in 1951 by the American Law Institute, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar
Association2 In 1956, after it had been enacted in only one state, Penn-
sylvania, it was subjected to a comprehensive re-examination and re-
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vision in the light of critical
comment, particularly the 1956
report of the New York
Law Revision Commission.3
That report also pointed out
the need for periodic study and
revision. Thus in 1961 the
sponsors took steps to create a
Permanent Editorial Board4 to
consider proposed amendments
and, subject to approval by the
sponsors, to approve and pro-
mulgate amendments when:
'(a) It has been shown by experience under the Code that a par-
1. The enacting states, in chronological order by year of enactment, are as follows:
State Enawted Effective
Pa. 1953, 1959 July 1, 1954; revision Jan. 1, 1960
Mass. 1957 Oct. 1, 1958; amended Dec. 13, 1959
Ky. 1958 July 1, 1960
N. H. 1959 July 1, 1961
Conn. 1959 Oct. 1, 1961
R. I. 1960 Jan. 2, 1962
Ark. 1961 Jan. 1, 1962
N. M. 1961 Jan. 1, 1962
Wyo. 1961 Jan. 1, 1962
Ohio 1961 July 1, 1962
IIL 1961 July 1, 1962
Okla. 1961 Jan. 1, 1963
N. J. 1961 Jan. 1, 1963
Ore. 1961 Sept. 1, 1963
Alaska 1962 Jan. 1, 1963
Ga. 1962 Apr. 1, 1963
Mich. 1962 Jan. 1, 1964
N. Y. 1962 Sept. 27,1964
2. See Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 798 (1958); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review, Assessment, Prospect
-November, 1959, 15 Bus. LAW. 348 (1960).
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ticular provision is unworkable or for any other reason obviously re-
quires amendment; or
'(b) Court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation of a
provision of the Code doubtful and an amendment can dear up the
doubt; or
'(c) New commercial practices shall have rendered any provisions
of the Code obsolete or have rendered new provisions desirable.'5
The purpose of this article is to outline and discuss some of the prob-
lems facing the Permanent Editorial Board, which held its first meet-
ing in May of 1962.
THE NEED FOR A THIRD LOOK
Most of those who took a leading part in the formulation of the
Code seem to have a continuing pride in the product. As in any col-
lective effort, there were differences of view which were resolved by
discussion, by compromise, and by vote; and probably no one person
has agreed with every decision made. Thus, the late Professor Llewellyn,
the chief draftsman of the Code, complained that his own efforts,
. . . successful for a while, to reintroduce the 'current course' idea into
the Uniform Commercial Code artide on commercial paper stirred up a
witch hunt almost like that of Brandeis against Swift v. Tyson,8
and that the witch hunt was successful. He further stated, "But it is plain
that I could not be less convinced of error."7  But neither he nor lesser
participants have shown much disposition to seek a reversal of such de-
cisions once the issue has been fully discussed and resolved.
On the other hand, a number of participants, and many people who
did not participate in the original drafting or the 1956 revision, now
have had extensive experience in applying Code provisions to problems
arising in teaching, in office practice, and in litigation. There are those
who believe that on the basis of such experience, particularly in the
field of chattel security, the Code provisions now could be reorganized
and recast in a simpler, clearer, and more useful form. The prevailing
view at the moment seems to be that any thoroughgoing revision should
await more widespread enactment and the development of experience
3. See 1956 State of New York Law Revision Commission Report, Report and Appendices
Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code. [hereinafter cited as 1956 Commission Report).
For the 1956 Uniform Commercial Code amendments and the reasons for them, see 1956
Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (1957); Braucher,
The 1956 Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L REV. 3 (1956).
4. See 1961 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
165-70; Schnader, Foreword to UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE §§ 1-101 to 3-805 (U.LA.)
at x-xi (1962).
5. 1961 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
165, 166.
6. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 419-20 (1960). See also id. at 181 n.182.
7. Id. at 420.
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under the Code in such important commercial states as Ohio and Illinois.
In any event, any structural revision would be extremely dangerous if it
were accomplished in a hurry, without adequate time for circulation,
discussion, and critical comment. Not nearly enough time was available
for this task before the legislative sessions of 1963, and the Editorial
Board was faced with more than enough immediate problems in con-
nection with the preparation of bills for 1963.
Comprehensive revision thus seems to be some years away. But it
would seem desirable that preparatory review should begin soon.
The Immediate Problem for 1963
The Editorial Board has appointed three sub-committees: one on
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title; a
second on Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, Letters of
Credit, and Investment Securities; and a third on Article 9 - Secured
Transactions. Their initial project will be to review the statutory varia-
tions, perhaps 300 in number, in the eighteen present Code states. It
is doubtful whether they will be able to accomplish much more than
this in time for 1963 legislative sessions, but they will undoubtedly at-
tempt to review numerous amendments which have been proposed in
New York, California, and Wisconsin.8 The New York amendments,
especially those which were embodied in the Code as enacted in New
York, have particular significance because of the importance of New
York as a commercial center and the standing of those who proposed
them.
New York bankers and their counsel were for a long time the most
effective opponents of the Code, and their influence was felt in other
states as well as in New York. Their objections led to the most compre-
hensive review of the Code, undertaken by the New York Law Revision
Commission in 1953, and they were active and vocal opponents at the
public hearings held by that Commission. Their views had a substantial
impact on the 1956 report of the Commission and on the Code revision
which followed. In 1960 the New York legislature appropriated funds
for the preparation of annotations to the Code, and subcommittees of
New York Bar Associations and of the New York Clearing House Asso-
ciation undertook to study the Code as revised. The Clearing House
study was particularly thorough and resulted in a report proposing some
sixty-nine changes in the Code, thirty-nine of which were styled "changes
essential to the Code."9
8. See Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 992 (1962); The Uniform Commercial
Code, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 119 (1962); 3 Wis. Legis. Council, 1961 Report, Part I.
9. New York Clearing House Association, Report on the Uniform Commercial Code (1961)
[hereinafter cited as CHA Report]. See also N. Y. Commission on Uniform State Laws, New
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Early in 1962 members of a subcommittee appointed by the sponsors'
Permanent Editorial Board met with representatives of the Clearing
House Association, the New York Commissioners on Uniform Laws,
and legislative and executive officials of the state. After extended and
sometimes heated discussion, a Code bill was introduced which incorpo-
rated a number of non-uniform amendments. The Clearing House
Association repeated some of its remaining objections at a joint hearing
of the New York Senate and Assembly Judiciary committees, but later
withdrew its unresolved objections and supported the bill. After the
bill was enacted, representatives of the Clearing House Association were
invited to serve on the subcommittees of the Editorial Board. These
subcommittees will undoubtedly report on the Clearing House proposals,
both those reflected in the New York bill and those not so reflected.
Types of Amendments Proposed
As indicated, structural changes in the Code, involving change in
section numbers or reallocation of subject matter between sections, are
unlikely to be recommended this year. Stylistic amendments within
sections are also likely to be resisted unless a section is amended in
some other respect as well. When such amendments and what seem
to be typographical errors are eliminated, the list of enacted variations in
the eighteen Code states shrinks to a manageable size. For example,
Ohio saw fit to invite confusion by renumbering and rearranging sections
and also by omitting provisions for short titles and a severability clause.
Various other states omitted section captions and a provision that they
are part of the Code. The subcommittees can be confident that the
Editorial Board will not recommend such aberrations for uniform adop-
tion.
Three other types of amendments, though they may be regrettable,
pose no problem for the national sponsors. First, some amendments are
designed to meet a purely local situation, such as a pre-existing statute
or rule of law. Thus Massachusetts and Ohio omitted section 1-102(5),
relating to number and gender, apparently because the matter is ade-
quately covered in other statutes. Local, in a somewhat different way,
is a provision added to section 9-109(3) in Massachusetts and Rhode
Island: "'Crops' include oysters on leased, licensed or owned beds."
Second, some amendments simply embody a reversal of a controversial
Code policy which has been fully debated many times. Thus the 1961
California bill included an amendment to section 2-403, designed to deny
York Annotations to the Uniform Commercial Code, and Report of Commission on Uniform
Commercial Code (1961); N. Y. Commission, Supplementary Report on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (1962); Committee on Uniform State Laws of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Report on the Uniform Commercial Code (1962).
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protection to a buyer in ordinary course from a dealer in watches where
the watch had been left with the dealer for repair, rather than with a
view to sale."° Third, amendments which do not darify have sometimes
been made for the purpose of clarification. An example is the Massa-
chusetts insertion in sections 7-210, 7-308, and 9-507 of language adapted
from section 2-704(2): validation of foreclosure sales was limited by
the words "... . in good faith for the purposes of avoiding or reducing loss
and of effective realization .... ," a wholly unnecessary gloss on the
general requirement of good faith in enforcement laid down by section
1-203."
Amendments of these three types are likely to result from the fact
that a small group or even a strategically-placed individual can some-
times prevent the enactment of a massive piece of legislation like the
Code. A threat of sabotage may make it necessary for the proponents
to consent to unsound amendments in order to obtain enactment. On
the one hand, the Editorial Board is unlikely to approve such amend-
ments unless they have general application and either some merit not
previously rejected or a political appeal which justifies reconsideration.
If these conditions are met, on the other hand, the Editorial Board is
authorized to act: a 1962 amendment to its charter permits approval of
amendments, after investigation, if they would lead to wider enactment
of the Code and are likely to be accepted in the eighteen Code states.
The remaining types of amendments are those with which the Edi-
torial Board will be primarily concerned. First and easiest is the cor-
rection of obvious error. Second is the resolution of ambiguity disclosed
by judicial decision. Third is the recognition of new commercial prac-
tices or other developments since the Code was promulgated. Finally,
the most difficult questions will relate to old controversies on which
new light is claimed to have been shed. The balance of the present
discussion will deal with specific points which may be thought to fall
in one of these classes. Attention will be directed particularly to articles
1, 2, 6, and 7, since the writer has undertaken some responsibility for
the study of these articles.
ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1-201(27): Notice to an Organization
The Code distinguishes between notice, notification, receipt of a
notification, and knowledge.'" The "witch hunt" against Professor Llew-
10. Compare Commerdal Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc., 180 N.E.2d 88 (Mass. 1962)
(pre-Code law), with Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
11. Cf. In the Matter of the Estate of Kiamie, 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N-B.2d 745 (1955)
("good faith" before the Code).
12. UCC § 1-201(25)-(27); cf. UCC § 3-304, 8-304.
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ellyn's reintroduction of the "current course" concept was finally suc-
cessful in eliminating references to "reasonable commercial standards"
from the general definitions of "good faith" and of "holder in due
course," but related objections to the use of an "objective" standard of
notice were met only in part in the 1956 revision and were renewed in
1961. 8
Under both the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Code,
a holder in due course takes a negotiable instrument free of personal
defenses and adverse claims, and under both statutes holding in due
course is limited to one who takes "without notice" of defenses or
claims. But Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law section 56 equates
"notice" for this purpose to "actual knowledge" or "knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith;"
under the Code "notice" includes "reason to know" and receipt of a
notification as well as "knowledge." Moreover, Code section 1-201(27)
provides:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organiza-
tion is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction,
and in any event from the time when it would have been brought to
his attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.
The New York Clearing House Association asserted that these pro-
visions would substitute a standard of "due diligence" for the "subjective"
standard of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law sometimes called
"the rule of the pure heart and the empty head" or "a simple test of
good faith and honesty in fact." Ignoring a sentence added to section
1-201(25) in 1956, "The time and circumstances under which a notice
or notification may cease to be effective are not determined by this Act,"
the Clearing House Association also adverted to the problem of "forgot-
ten notice," and asserted that the Code concept of notice would require a
business organization of any size to make an extensive investigation be-
fore purchasing commercial paper or investment securities. 4
The Clearing House objection seemed to relate primarily to the pur-
chase of negotiable instruments, and it was met in the New York Code,
not by an amendment to the general definitions in article 1, but by
the addition of new subsections to sections 3-304 and 8-304, relating
to holding in due course of commercial paper and bona fide purchase
of investment securities. The new subsections first substantially re-
13. See LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 6; Braucher, Legislative History of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 798, 812-14 (1958); 1 1954 State of New York Law
Revision Commission Report, Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 203-07; 1956
Commission Report 360-61, 407; Committee on Uniform State Laws, supra note 9, at 16-17,
45-46; CHA Report 3, 18 (1961).
14. CHA Report 18 (1961); cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Fazzari, 10 N.Y.2d 394, 179 N.E.2d 493
(1961) (estoppel to assert that notice was forgotten).
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enacted Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law section 56; a second
sentence then provided for organizations:
If the purchaser is an organization and maintains within the organiza-
tion reasonable routines for communicating significant information to
the appropriate part of the organization apparently concerned, the
individual conducting the transaction on behalf of the purchaser must
have the knowledge.";
These New York amendments left untouched the numerous other
situations in which Code rules turn on the receipt of notice, knowledge,
or a notification. If a satisfactory verbal formula can be found, the
Editorial Board will probably have to consider whether it should be in-
serted in the general provisions of article 1. The New York formula
provides a suitable gloss on one aspect of "due diligence" in communica-
tion within an organization, the maintenance of communication rou-
tines, but it seems to dispense with any requirement that the routines
be followed in the particular case. A requirement of reasonable compli-
ance with the routines should probably be added, and guidelines may
be needed to distinguish the information which should be circulated
within an organization from that which need not be. But such attempts
to make more precise the "due diligence" required are likely to result in
inordinate expansion of the Code text.
Concern over this problem is not peculiar to New York. The Cali-
fornia Bankers Assodation recommended that all duty of inter-branch
communication be eliminated, and the 1961 Code bill in California
limited the duty to cases where the individual receiving information "is
aware of the transaction" in another branch which might be affected.
Like the New York Code, the California bill also amended section 4-106
to negate imputation of notice from one branch to another with respect
to bank deposits and collections. Such provisions have statutory prece-
dent in California.' But the California case principally relied on as
negating imputation of notice between branches simply applies a Cali-
fornia statute imputing notice of what an agent or principal "... . ought,
in good faith and the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, to com-
municate to the other."'"
An Ohio case points up the problem. In Davis v. Commercial Credit
Corporation"8 a "fly-by-night" contractor had defrauded buyers of asbestos
siding in Pennsylvania and had discounted their notes with the Pennsyl-
vania subsidiary of a national finance company. Later, the same con-
tractor engaged in similar practices in Ohio and discounted the notes
15. N.Y. UCC §§ 3-304(7), 8-304(3).
16. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 991, 1012(c), 1018.
17. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 123 Cal. App. 2d 380, 266 P.2d 914 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954) (applying CAL. CIM. CODE § 2332).
18. 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950).
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with a different subsidiary. By virtue of the common parent and super-
vision by the same division manager it was held that customers' com-
plaints brought home to the second subsidiary knowledge fatal to its
status as holder in due course. The case may be explained as part of a
trend toward denial of holder in due course status to purchasers of con-
sumer paper,'9 but on its face the opinion rests on a standard of diligence
in internal communication which may well be quite impracticable in a
large organization.
It seems unlikely that the Editorial Board will adopt the New York
or California proposal or otherwise approve any drastic narrowing of
the duty of internal communication in a large organization. Our tradi-
tion is strongly against a rule ". . . that great business houses are held
to less responsibility than small ones,"2 or that special treatment for the
large organization is required ". . . by the largeness of its dealings and
its having to employ agents to do what if done by the principal in per-
son would leave no room for doubt."'" Nor does it seem desirable to
lay down a relaxed general standard for branch banks, since other types
of organizations have similar problems and since the problem of internal
communications may be just as difficult within a single skyscraper. But
in the interest of the security of commercial transactions it may be proper
to negate a standard of notice or knowledge based on "... piecing to-
gether all the facts known to different employees ....
ARTICLE 2 - SALES
Section 2-318: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
The 1950 draft of the Code provided for impleader in warranty ac-
tions and for a direct action against any person subject to impleader."3 It
also extended warranty protection
... to any natural person who is in the family or household of the
buyer or who is his guest or one whose relationship to him is such as
to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty .... 24
Representatives of affected industries protested vigorously,25 and in
19. Cf. UCC § 9-206(1) and comment 1.
20. United States v. National Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926).
21. Id. at 535.
22. See Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARv. L. REV. 454, 481 (1921).
23. UCC § 2-718, 2-719 (1950).
24. UCC 2-318 (1950).
25. See Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 113, 187-92 (1951).
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the Code as promulgated the impleader and direct action provisions were
omitted and the class of statutory beneficiaries was restricted.
Section 2-318 as promulgated extended a seller's warranty only
... to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty ....
A reference to employees of an industrial consumer was deleted from
the comment, and a statement was inserted that beyond those expressly
included
... the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.26
In the succeeding years the requirement of privity in warranty cases
has been steadily eroded, and in many jurisdictions the "developing case
law" has given the benefit of warranties to persons not included in the
Code language. 7 In New York, long one of the citadels of privity, the
court of appeals first adopted by judicial decision the rule laid down
in section 2-318,"8 and then went well beyond it.29 In New York, and
many other jurisdictions, it is now dear that beneficiaries of a warranty
are not restricted to natural persons, much less to family, household,
and guests of the buyer, and that beneficiaries are not limited to personal
injury claims.
When the Code was enacted in Wyoming, section 2-318 was
amended to extend a seller's warranty "to any person who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is in-
jured by breach of the warranty."30  The 1961 California bill simply
omitted section 2-318 on the ground that it would be "a step backward"
from the existing California law.3" These events may indicate that it is
time for the Editorial Board to promulgate a more progressive formula-
tion, at least as an alternative for adoption in states where the require-
26. UCC § 2-318 comment 3.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SEcom), TORTs § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962); Dickerson,
Recent Developments in Food Products Liability, 8 PRAc. LAW., No. 4, p. 17 (April 1962);
Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960). But see Condon, Developments with Respect to Product Liability, 17 FooD DRUG
CosM. L.. 195 (1962).
28. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961). Accord, McBurnette v.
Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
29. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
30. WYo. STAT..ANN. § 40A-2-318 (Supp. 1961). See Carrington, The Uniform Corm-
mnercial Code - Sales, Bulk Sales, and Documents of Title, 15 WYo. LJ. 1, 9-11 (1960).
31. See Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary, Sixth Progress Report to the Legisla-
ture (1959-61), Part I, Uniform Commercial Code, 457-58.
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ment of privity has been abandoned. The Wyoming formulation seems
acceptable for this purpose.
Section 2-702: Seller's Remedies on
Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency
Section 2-702(2) codifies and limits the right of a seller to reclaim
goods from an insolvent buyer who has misrepresented his solvency or
his intent to pay."2 Subsection (3) subjects the seller's right to reclaim
" . . to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403) ."" Section
2-403 provides as to lien creditors only that their rights are governed
by articles 6, 7, and 9, and those articles seem to contain no relevant
provisions except section 9-301 (3), defining "lien creditor" to include
an attaching or levying creditor, an assignee for benefit of creditors, a
trustee in bankruptcy, or a receiver in equity.
In In re Kravitz4 the court ruled that the effect of these confusing
cross-references was to refer the problem of conflict between the re-
claiming seller and trustee in bankruptcy to the Pennsylvania law prior
to the Code. Under that law a lien creditor who extended credit subse-
quent to the sale prevailed over the defrauded seller. The trustee in
bankruptcy was given the status of an "ideal lien creditor" by the Bank-
ruptcy Act and, therefore, also prevailed over the seller. Thus the right
of reclamation granted by section 2-702 was ineffective in the principal
situation where it might be useful.
In many states the pre-Code law would seem to allow a defrauded
seller to reclaim against an attaching creditor, regardless of when credit
was extended. " But there seems to be no good reason for leaving the
matter to pre-Code law. Accordingly, the words "or lien creditor" were
deleted from section 2-702(3) as enacted in Illinois, New Mexico, and
New York, and as proposed in California. It would seem appropriate
for the Editorial Board to approve that change.
ARTICLES 3, 4, AND 5
The New York Clearing House Association proposed a substantial
number of amendments to the Code articles on Commercial Paper, Bank
Deposits and Collections, and Letters of Credit, and several changes were
32. Cf. California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933).
33. See Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of Uniform Commercial Code Section
2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. the Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent.
14 W. REs. L. REv. 93 (1962).
34. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960); see Hawkland, Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and
Defrauded Sellers - Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz
Case, 67 CoM. LJ. 86 (1962).
35. Cf. McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 154 N.E. 755 (1927).
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made in the New York Code in response to those proposals. Those
changes have been the subject of recent published discussion, 6 and it is
sufficient here to list those which seem most likely to receive attention.
These include changes in sections 3-105 and 3-112 to preserve the nego-
tiability of note forms in common use, amendment of section 3-122 to
negate the running of interest before demand on instruments such as a
certified check, deletion of "continental" from the phrase "continental
United States" in section 3-412 and 3-504 to take account of the state-
hood of Hawaii and Alaska, and provision in section 3-415 for war-
ranties by an accommodation indorser.
More significant are two proposals to take account of developments
in banking practice: a new section 4-109 to define the "process of post-
ing," and changes in sections 3-504 and 4-204 to authorize presentment
of items to electronic processing centers The important problem of
notice to an organization has been discussed previously; it may involve
some change in section 4-106 regarding branch banks. Finally, the New
York amendment regarded as the most significant by the Clearing House
Association makes article 5 inapplicable to any letter of credit which
... by its terms or by agreement or by custom [is] subject in whole
or in part to the Uniform Customs and Practices for Commercial
Documentary Credits fixed by the Thirteenth or by any subsequent Con-
gress of the International Chamber of Commerce....as
ARTICLE 6 - BULK TRANSFERS
The Bulk Transfers article of the Code has been substantially re-
written in California on the theory that uniformity is not essential in this
field."9 The effect of the California changes is to preserve pre-existing
California law. Three major departures from the Code are (1) cover-
age of bulk transfers for security, (2) substitution of a single recorded
and filed notice for individual notices to creditors, and (3) a longer
statute of limitations. The Editorial Board is not likely to adopt any
of these changes.
Outside California, article 6 seems not to have been too trouble-
some. Changes in five sections seem worthy of consideration, but all
are minor technical changes. Section 6-103 provides for "public notice"
in two situations without specifying detail, and a Georgia amendment
enacted as section 6-106 would add precision. Section 6-104(2) was
36. See Penney, supra note 8. See also forthcoming discussion by the writer in the Rutgers
Iaw Review dealing with the New York changes in article 3.
37. See Clarke, Electronic Brains for Banks, 17 Bus. LAW. 532, 539-40 (1962); Funk, Pre-
sentment under the Uniform Commercial Code - A Reply to Mr. Clarke, 17 Bus. LAW. 548
(1962).
38. N.Y. UCC § 5-102(1).
39. See The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 119, 174-78 (1962).
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amended in New York to provide that only the indenture trustee need
be listed as a creditor in a case involving an issue of bonds or debentures.
Optional section 6-106, providing for application of purchase money to
the transferor's debts, has been enacted in Georgia, Kentucky, New Jer-
sey, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania; it could well provide for payment into
court in the event of dispute as to distribution." Finally, "registered
mail" in sections 6-107(3) and 6-108(3) (b) could well be changed to
"registered or certified mail."'"
ARTICLE 7 - DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
The Code provisions on Documents of Title have been revised in
California, largely at the instance of the California Warehousemen's
Association." The revision seems to be continuing, and the problems
raised seem not to have troubled other states. The only change which
now seems ripe for consideration by the Editorial Board is a provision for
certified as well as registered mail in section 7-210(2) (b).
ARTICLE 8 - INVESTMENT SECURITIES
Recent discussion of the New York changes in article 8" need not
be repeated here. The Editorial Board will have to consider a provision
that securities are "fungible" in section 8-105, a provision for the seller's
action for the price in section 8-107, modification of section 8-202(5)
concerning "when, as and if issued" contracts, redefinition of the warranty
of "proper form" in section 8-208, the question whether a broker can be
an "intermediary" under section 8-306(3), and the clarification of sec-
tion 8-313 (2) regarding the status of a broker as a holder. The most
interesting New York variation in article 8 is a new section 8-320 author-
izing a central depository and clearance system like the one which the
New York Stock Exchange has been conducting for several years as a
pilot operation.
Fiduciary Security Transfers
An important problem for the Editorial Board is the relation of the
Code to the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers." The Uniform Act was promulgated in 1958 and has been
enacted in thirty-five states and the District of Columbia. Shortly after
40. Cf. PA. LAWS 1919, act 262 § 3.
41. Cf. Pacific Discount Co. v. Jackson, 37 N.J. 169, 179 A.2d 745 (1962) (notice by
certified mail permitted under Uniform Conditional Sales Act).
42. See The Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 39, at 178-85; cf. Steinmeyer, Develop-
ments in the Law of Documents of Title, 16 Bus. LAW. 858, 865-69 (1961).
43. See note 36 supra.
44. See Braucher, Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 43 MWIN. L. REv. 193 (1958).
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its promulgation conforming amendments were made in the Code. But
no effort was made to conform the terminology of the two statutes, and
there are at least three minor differences of substance between them.
Accordingly, the writer suggested in 1958 that "as an esthetic matter"
it might be desirable to provide that in the event of conflict the Uniform
Act prevailed.45 Proponents of the Code have since adopted this policy
for states which enact the Code subsequent to the adoption of the Uni-
form Act, and it has been followed in Illinois and New York.
In 1959 Mr. Christy, the author of the standard treatise on the
transfer of stock, prepared a set of recommended rules for the New York
Stock Transfer Association.4 Under these rules simplified transfer pro-
cedures would be followed if either the Code or the Uniform Act or a
similar but earlier Model Act were in force in the state of incorporation,
the state of the transfer agent, and the state of the trust or estate. A few
transfer agents, however, are reported to have refused to recognize the
Code as a sufficient basis for simplifcationY Moreover, New Jersey
and Connecticut repealed the Uniform and Model Acts, respectively,
when they enacted the Code, and several other states have enacted the
Code subsequent to the adoption of the Uniform Act without providing
expressly for the resolution of possible conflicts. Not unnaturally, the
result has induced some dissatisfaction on the part of those who have
worked long and hard on the simplification of fiduciary security transfers.
One solution is the saving clause for the Uniform Act. There seems
to be some prospect that New Jersey will re-enact the Uniform Act with
such a saving clause before the Code takes effect January 1, 1963. But
for the long run, the solution is to make the Code as universally ac-
ceptable among transfer agents as the Uniform Act now seems to be.
Primarily the problem is an educational one, but it is the writer's belief
that the Editorial Board should do its best to lay the ghosts which some
transfer agents have associated with the Code.
Perhaps the principal such ghost is what may be called the Case of
the Removed Fiduciary. If Simon Stockholder dies and Edward Executor
duly qualifies as his executor, section 8-308 (3) (d) provides that Edward
Executor is an appropriate person to indorse Simon Stockholder's stock.
The transfer agent under section 8-402 may protect itself by requiring
a signature guarantee and a court certificate dated within sixty days be-
fore the date of presentation for transfer. If Edward Executor is removed
as executor after obtaining the certificate but before he signs, his signa-
45. Id. at 215.
46. Stock Transfer Association, Rules Governing Fiduciary Transfers under the New Sim.
Plification Statutes, 2 CHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STOcK A277-A286 (3d ed. 1962).
47. See Partridge, Report of the Committee on Simplification of Security Transfers by Fi-
duciaries, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 891, 892 (1961).
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ture is like a forgery of Simon Stockholder's name. Under sections 8-404
and 8-406 the issuer and transfer agent are then liable to Simon Stock-
holder's estate, but under section 8-312(1) (b) they have recourse
against the signature guarantor. This is the purpose of the signature
guarantee, and issuers and transfer agents have been willing to take the
risk of the insolvency of the signature guarantor. So far so good.
But now suppose that Edward Executor obtains registration of trans-
fer into his own name as executor. Section 8-403 (3) (a) says that the
issuer may assume without inquiry that Edward Executor continues to
be the fiduciary until the issuer receives written notice to the contrary.
In such a case, according to comment I to section 8-404, the only neces-
sary indorsement is that of Edward Executor as "... . the person specified
by the security . . . to be entitled to the security . . . ." under section
8-308(3) (a). Hence the issuer, transfer agent, and signature guarantor
are free of any risk in the event that Edward Executor had been removed
before he indorsed the security.
Some transfer agents, however, are not satisfied to rely on a mere
comment. If Edward Executor is no longer serving as executor, they say,
section 8-308(3) (b) specifies "his successor" as the appropriate person
to indorse, and that provision excludes signature by Edward Executor
himself under section 8-308(3) (a). Thus there is a direct conflict be-
tween section 8-308(3) (b) and section 8-403(3) (a), and no principle
is provided to resolve the conflict. This fear is strengthened somewhat
by a typographical error in the comment to section 8-404, by which it re-
fers to section 8-308(1) (a) instead of section 8-308(3) (a) as it plainly
should.
In the judgment of the writer, this fear is not justified. But there is
at least an ambiguity, and the Editorial Board should dear it up. Sec-
tion 8-308(3) (b) should be amended to provide that, where stock is
registered in the name of a fiduciary and the fiduciary ceases to serve as
such, either the removed fiduciary or his successor is an appropriate
person to indorse. This would harmonize with the Uniform Act and
go far to reconcile opposing views which have held back the simplifica-
tion movement. If Mr. Christy's view could be made to prevail, only
Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, and Vermont would lack effective simplification
legislation.
ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS
The New York Clearing House Association proposed eleven changes
in article 9 as "essential to the Code." Only two changes were made
in response to those proposals, but some of the others will undoubtedly
be on the agenda of the Editorial Board. In addition, the New York
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Code makes a series of innovations with respect to filing, at least one of
which may prove suitable for uniform adoption. The significant prob-
lems with respect to article 9 are too complex for anything but mention
here. First, certain of the choice-of-law rules in section 9-103, which turn
on the debtor's chief place of business or on the office where he keeps
certain records, are not entirely satisfactory where they refer the prob-
lem to the law of a foreign nation.48 Second, some provision should be
made for changes in the location of the chief place of business or record-
keeping office.49 Third, section 9-313 on security interests in fixtures
badly needs some definition of fixture.5" Finally, section 9-401 on the
place of filing would be improved if "residence" were given precision as
applied to a corporation or partnership.51
48. Cf. Doskow, Transistory Chattels and Stationary Law: A Proposal to Facilitate Secured
Financing of Aircraft Employed in International Flight, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 36 (1959);
Comment, Multistate Accounts Receivable Financing: Conflicts in Context, 67 YALE Lj. 402,
431 n.104 (1958).
49. Cf. UCC § 9-401(3).
50. See Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1319 (1962); The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 119, 201
(1962).
51. Cf. N.Y. UCC § 9-401 (1) (e). As to filing problems generally, see Coogan, Public
Notice under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Includ-
ing "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. REv. 289 (1962); Haydock, Certainty and Convenience -
Criteria for the Place of Filing under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 BOSTON COLLEGE
IND. & COM. L. REV. 179 (1962).
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